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MUTUAL MISPERCEPTIONS: THE ACADEMIC AND THE SOLDIER
L..
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
by
COLONEL DONALD F . BLETZ, USA
, I '

&&" - 1 '
(What are the mutual misperceptions held
by the American academic and military
professions? How might these
misperceptions be dispelled?)

Our American society is a composite of
many groups and subgroups. That society is in
the midst of a dramatic re-evaluation and of
change. Within this context of change, it is
p e r h a p s t h e a c a d e m i c a n d military
"communities" which most distrust and
misunderstand each other. Each seems to be
convinced that it is the true guardian of
American democracy as it was intended to be,
and that the other is both the epitome of all
that is wrong with our society and the chief
enemy of our way of life. This is, of course,
an intentional overstatement. But it contains
enough resemblance to the perceptions each
holds of the other to be worth examining
further.
Actually, along with a number of deep
philosophical differences, t h e t w o
communities have many characteristics in
common. Therefore, this mutual and deeply
Colonel Donald F. Bletz, Infantry, NWC 1968,
holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of
Omaha, a Master's Degree from The American
University, Washington, D.C., and is a doctoral
candidate at The American University (International
Studies). He has held a variety of infantry staff and
command assignments including duty in World War II ,
Korea, and Vietnam. On the Army Staff he served in
the Office of thc Chief of
Staff. On the USAWC faculty,
his present position, Colonel
Bletz is Director, Pacific Area
Studies and Acting Director,
South Asian and Middle East
Studies. Prior to assuming his
present position he was a
Fellow a t t h e H a r v a d
U n i v e r s i t y Center for
I n ternational Affairs.

rooted lack of understanding is doubly
disturbing, and American democracy can only
lose thereby. The purpose of this article is t o
identify some of the similarities and
differences of the two communities, t o point
out the areas of their interdependence, and to
emphasize the dependence of our society on
both. It is limited to the misperceptions one
profession holds of the other, and how they
might be dispelled through mutual trust and
understanding.
The "academic" and the "soldier" mean
many things to many people. Therefore, it
seems appropriate at this point to define these
terms as they will be used here. The academic
is considered to be a duly appointed member
of the faculty of a recognized American
college or university, a member of the
"academic profession." Because of the nature
of this paper most of the remarks will be
directed to the "arts and sciences" segment of
the academic profession and not t o that
p o r t i o n associated with business or
"professional" schools. The word soldier
includes the career commissioned officer
corps of the nation's armed forces in the same
sense that it has been used by Professors
Janowitz and Huntington. In other words, the
"soldier" we are talking about is a member of
the "military profession."
In discussing these two groups, one must
guard against seeing them as monoliths which
can be dealt with as homogeneous entities.
Unhappily, such a misperception does appear
to be held by the more radical and least
informed elements in both professions. In
actual fact, each of the professions consists of
a somewhat heterogeneous assortment of
human beings.1
HISTORY

It is generally accepted that the academic
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and the soldier share a strong mutual
antipathy. This attitude i s deeply rooted in
American history. Furthermore, neither the
academic nor the military communities have
been consistently held in especially high
esteem by the nation as a whole. That this
esteem has tended to be cyclic is exemplified,
for example, by the wartime (World War I I)
popularity of the military profession, and the
post-Sputnik popularity of the academic
profession.
The cultural underpinnings for many of the
mutual problems of the American academic
and military professions are often typified in
our literature by Western books or movies
which include an academic and a soldier in
their cast of characters. The academic is
usually depicted as a school teacher who goes
by the title of "professor" (it must be a man
in this scenario), who is quiet and intelligent
but apparently unmanly. The soldier, on the
o t h e r hand, is frequently a military
professional commanding the nearby fort who
is shown as a manly but not too intelligent
graduate of the United States Military
Academy. In all probability, both have an
alcohol problem induced by some dark page
in their past and neither is inclined to be too
"chummy" with the other. As a matter of
fact, if left to their own devices they would,
collectively or individually, bring great
tragedy upon the frontier community.
The hero is a rugged individual clad in
buckskin who somehow compensates for the
shortcomings of both academic and soldier
and saves the day. The soldier and the scholar
are tolerated by the frontier community
because of the service they provide, but the
buckskin-clad hero and his friends can hardly
accept them as full members of the human
race. This stereotype of the soldier and the
scholar has not disappeared totally from our
national thinking.
SIMILARITIES

It was suggested earlier that the academic
and military professions share a number of
characteristics. Perhaps the most pronounced
is a feeling of alienation from American
society as a whole. One is struck by the fact

that, with the change of only a few words,
l o n g p a s s a g e s f r o m Hofstadter's
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life would
depict clearly the military professional's
perception of his place in American society.
T h e "nobody loves us" syndrome is
undoubtedly shared by the two professions.2
The significant point is, however, not
whether the professions are "unloved" or
which ranks above the other but rather why
the members are alienated from society. In
both cases there may well be a self-imposed
alienation. In the case of the academic, Shils
has suggested that, "for the most part
American scholarly and literary intellectuals
lived in a world they never made and for
which they took no responsibility."3 Another
points out that some members of the
intellectual community feel their alienation
from society to be "an inevitable consequence
of the character of their work and the social
environment in which they live."4 The
military professional, on the other hand,
would probably be somewhat appalled by the
first reason, because the acceptance of
responsibility is allegedly part of his ethic.
After additional thought, however, he would
most likely concede that he too often denies
any responsibility for American society
except as its defender.
Prior to World War II, the American
military professional normally did not vote
because to d o so was generally considered
alien to the military ethic. Additionally, it
was o f t e n impossible because today's
elaborate machinery for absentee registration
and voting was nonexistent. There are still
some soldiers who do not vote because they
feel it is professionally improper to do so. To
many contemporary military professionals
such self-imposed alienation from society has
n o m o r e justification than does the
self-imposed alienation of the academic. It
must be emphasized that this sort of
alienation is not typical of either profession.
The argument that the "character of their
work" alienates both professions from society
as a whole seems to be more meaningful;
however, it can hardly serve as a justification
for professional hibernation.
Another characteristic shared by both
4

professions is something of an extension of
the "separation from the mainstream" of
American society mentioned above: it is a
preference for community living. Outward
manifestations of efforts to perpetuate the
very isolation about which both professions
are prone to complain are the cooperative
shopping facilities, book stores, student
unions, and faculty clubs on the campuses;
and the commissaries, post exchanges, service
clubs, and officers' messes on military posts.
This comparison could be carried to great
lengths, but it seems clear that both
professions are possessed of something of a
"reservation" or "total institution" instinct
which tends to turn them inward at the same
time they complain of being isolated from
society.
Both professions are dominated by a
recognizable hierarchical structure. In the
academic profession this structure is almost
completely decentralized and hence more
meaningful on any given campus. In the
military profession, with its centralized
authority, the structure is more~univers+l,
more institutionalized, more meaningful, and
less subtle than in the academic world. In
both cases there is a set of standards of a
technical and ethical nature to which the
members of the profession are expected to
conform. Broadly speaking, in the military
profession, many of these standards are stated
in published regulations and noncompliance
can lead to legal or extralegal sanctions,
including condemnation y peers. In the
academic profession, transgression of an
accepted norm is punished primarily by the
condemnation of peers or other extralegal
sanctions.
In any case the rules are there and success
depends on staying within the accepted
parameters. For practical purposes, it is the
rank structure in both professions which
makes the system work. The young scholar
who wishes to pursue an academic career
knows that he must satisfy his department
chairman or other immediate authority if he
is to succeed on a given campus. At the same
time, if he is t o establish a "scholarly"
reputation, he must be concerned with the
opinion of his professional colleagues on

other campuses. The young military officer
knows equally well that he must satisfy his
immediate superior if his career is to be a
success, but early in his career he is normally
less concerned with horizontal recognition.
Whichever form it takes, recognition is
equally important t o the academic and the
soldier. The means by which the aspiring
professionals within each group go about
gaining the recognition of their peers and
seniors varies, of course, in detail but
conceptually it is quite similar. In the military
profession m o s t young officers gain
recognition and acceptance by performing
their assigned duties in the best possible
manner within the parameters established by
accepted attitudes, doctrinal concepts, and
professional philosophies. In exchange they
are rewarded by high fitness reports, based on
closest possible observation, which become
part of the officer's official record. In
addition the officer ntay receive special letters
of commendation and citations or medals for
merit or gallantry. He may, of course, also
r e c e i v e l e t t e r s of reprimand o r
u n c o m p l i m e n t a r y f i t n e s s reports. In
combination, all these documents constitute
the officer's "file" and, together with other
less tangible measurements, establish his
professional reputation.
The source of a new officer's commission
may also have a bearing on the question of
professional recognition. A graduate of one of
the service academies normally starts his
career from a more advantageous position
than does an officer commissioned from other
sources. Though the service academy is the
"prestige" source of a commission, with few
exceptions performance over the years
determines a professional's career success.
The aspiring academic professional uses
somewhat different techniques to gain
professional recognition. It is difficult to
pinpoint how his teaching ability is judged as
direct "observation" seems nonexistent.
Numbers of students who register for a
course, passlfail statistics, student evaluations,
and other rather impersonal means may be
the only units of measurement, if indeed
there are any measurements at all. Academic
recognition seems to come primarily from
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research and writing. It is essential for the
aspiring academic to write and publish and he
will tend to seek out those positions in the
academic community which permit him to
emphasize research and writing over teaching.
The more the young scholar publishes, the
more likely he is to find employment on a
prestigious campus.
T h e source of the young scholar's
doctorate apparently serves much the same
function as the source of the officer's
commission. A recent study which evaluated
the relative prestige of doctoral origin and
scholarly performance in the selection for a
position found that "among younger faculty,
prestige of doctorate is used as a predictor of
future performance by those who are
responsible for faculty recruitment." 5 Like
the service academy commission, the prestige
doctorate gives the young professional an
advantageous position from which to launch
his career. While in both professions it is
performance over the years which determines
professional success, it is recognized that once
an academic professional has tenure his
performance no longer matters in quite the
same way, while in the military profession the
"up or out" concept applies throughout a
career.
The professional soldier is also encouraged
to write for publication. His motivation is,
however, quite different and his analysis will
normally involve professional military matters
rather than American society or public policy.
The soldier usually writes in military
professional journals which serve as a vehicle
for him to bring his ideas to the attention of
his peers and his seniors far up the chain of
command outside normal channels. But, while
encouraged, research, writing, and publication
are not the primary route to success in the
military profession.
Thus, the two professions place a different
emphasis on "doing" and "thinking." In the
military profession, success comes to the
"doer," or the commander or staff officer
who performs those essentially military
functions which require technical military
expertise. The academic professional, on the
other hand, must seek recognition as a
"thinker" if he is to succeed in his profession.

The purpose of this brief review of basic
similarities is t o discourage mutual
fingerpointing and recrimination and to
enhance mutual understanding between the
academic and military professions. It is
recognized fully that the similarities suggested
above a r e somewhat superficial when
compared with the profound philosophical
differences which exist.
PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES

In the broadest sense, and realizing that the
use of words like "liberal" and "conservative"
is very imprecise, it can be said that many
military professionals tend to lean more in the
conservative direction while many of today's
academic professionals lean toward the liberal
side. Whether philosophical orientation points
an individual toward one of the professions or
whether professional association leads to a
particular political philosophy is not
c o m p l e t e l y c l e a r . A politically
ultraconservative youth would, in all
probability, not be attracted to the academic
profession, especially the humanities or the
social sciences. It is equally likely that a
politically ultraliberal youth would shy away
from a military career. Aside from these
extremes, however, there are many other
factors which point one to or from either of
the professions, with the individual likely to
embrace the dominant professional ethic after
he becomes a part of the community. Many
members of both professions also tend to see
themselves as the true "realists" who alone
have the requisite insights to view the world
as it really is.
It is in fact much more enlightening to
examine the stance each profession takes in
relation to the politics of the country. The
academic feels he is a critic of contemporary
society, including its political system and
public policy, while the soldier sees himself as
the defender of that society. This is not to say
that most soldiers necessarily see themselves
as defenders of the status quo; they are not
opposed to change but they believe it must
come about in an orderly manner. Soldiers
constantly have in the back of their minds
their basic mission of national defense.
6

Concepts such as unilateral disarmament or
internal civic violence in pursuit of even the
most valid social goal are, therefore, seen by
many soldiers as detracting from the national
security. They are worried about them for
that reason.
The military professional takes an oath to
" . . .defend the constitution of the United
States. . . ." That Constitution provides for
the election of a President and makes the
President the Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces. Most soldiers have no difficulty
accepting the fact that the
Commander-in-Chief may be of a different
political party or orientation from their own.
The soldier's personal political philosophy is
subordinated to the system. It follows that
the military professional does not and cannot
see himself as the critic of public policy as
manifested by a given administration, and he
is not, and cannot be, the nation's foreign
policy conscience because that policy too
changes with administrations.
The American military profession is
normally considered a part of the national
decisionmaking process and the individual
military professional can, through his
professional association, identify himself as
something of an "insider" even if he
personally did not participate directly in
policy formulation. Perhaps this reinforces
the military ethic of subordinating personal
views to "policy." A l t h o u g h individual
academic professionals occasionally step
outside their profession to become "insiders,"
the profession as a whole, unlike the military
p r o f e s s i o n , is "outside" the normal
decisionmaking process. Most academics tend
to see themselves as perennial "outsiders" and
consequently have few inhibitions about
criticizing the administration in power.
While most soldiers can, despite their
p e r s o n a l p o l i t i c a l philosophies, bring
themselves to live with either liberal or
conservative administrations, so long as the
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is constitutional, many
academics find this more difficult to do. They
would see this tolerance of a contrary
political philosophy in Washington as
intellectually dishonest and in violation of
their professional ethic, while most soldiers

would see their own public criticism of it as
equally inappropriate.
A parting thought on the differences
between the two professions concerns the
fundamental purposes for which they exist.
Clearly, the raison d'etre of the military
profession is to protect the United States and
therefore to "fight" if called upon to do so.
Professor Lasswell's observation that the role
of the military profession is the "management
of violence" is perfectly valid. Every
professional officer understands that after all
the rhetoric is stripped away, his function
within the profession has meaning only if it
increases the ability of the profession to fight.
Most military professionals agree that the
existence of a competent military profession
should deter international activity leading t o
violence. This has not proven to be
completely true in the past and the
thoughtful soldier knows that he is expected
to be adequately sophisticated intelligently to
"
manage" violence so as to keep it within
bounds. He also knows that he has not always
been successful at this.
It is more difficult to identify a universally
accepted purpose for the academic profession.
One writer has defined it as:

. . . the

pursuit of truth and learning is
the central value of the university. This
value unites the university's primary
functional purpose of providing
education with the supporting purposes
of generating knowledge, serving the
community, and preserving our cultural
heritage.7
(Emphasis added)
This observation suggests that the teaching
function is primary but it is not a t all clear
that the profession as a whole agrees. Some
academics would argue that "generating
knowledge" is primary, while others would
prefer either of the two "supporting
purposes" referred to above.
T o argue that the central value of the
academic profession is the pursuit of truth
and learning, equates roughly to saying the
central value of the military profession is to
provide for the national security. Few
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professionals of either group would disagree
with these somewhat abstract purposes.
Taking the thinking
one step further,
however, uncovers a difference. To a man,
military professionals agree that they see to
the national security by being prepared to
fight—to manage violence. Most academic
professionals, on the other hand, are not in
agreement as how best to achieve their
purpose.
INSTANCES OF ACADEMIC-MILITARY
PARTNERSHIP

There have been times when the academic
profession's alienation from government has
been circumvented and a mass transfer of
scholars from the nation's campuses to
Washington has taken place. The two most
dramatic examples of mass transfers may be
found in the Franklin Roosevelt and John F.
Kennedy administrations.
In the 1930s, academic professionals felt
wanted and needed, and many found in the
New Deal philosophical tenets to which they
could relate. Some military professionals also
found themselves associated with the New
Deal, not necessarily because they agreed or
disagreed with it philosophically or because
t h e y felt w a n t e d , but because the
C o m m a n d e r -i n -C h i e f directed t h e i r
participation. Generally, professional soldiers
saw that participation as a distortion of their
basic mission and a dangerous dilution of
their ability to perform that mission.
With the coming of World Wa r II many
American academic professionals again
entered into a close association with the
government and developed lasting ties with
the nation's political and military elite.6 It
was a popular war, as wars go. Scholars,
especially those in the natural sciences,
developed the weapons, and the soldiers
employed them. Together they fought and
won the war. In that war, academicians had
little influence on the actual conduct of
military operations and in fact expressed little
concern over the now sometimes challenged
concept of "unconditional surrender" or
"mass destruction weapons." This is an
important distinction because of what was to

happen in the 1960s. Following the war many
academics who had joined the government
returned to the campuses. Many, however,
elected to retain an active relationship with
the government, whether in the Department
of Defense or elsewhere.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, possibly
a delayed reaction to World War II coupled
with over a decade of cold war, the academic
community began to show a deep interest in
military affairs as a significant, if not
necessarily welcome, part of the American
scene. This interest is illustrated by the
publication of Arms and Men: A Study in
American Military History, by historian
Walter Millis in 1957; The Soldier and the
State: T h e Theory and Politics o f
Civil-Military Relations, by political scientist
Samuel P. Huntington in 1957; and The
Professional Soldier: A Social and Political
Portrait, by sociologist Morris Janowitz in
1960.
These "military sociologists" concerned
themselves primarily with the American
military profession as a part of society. At
about the same time an academic interest by
"strategic analysts" in military matters also
manifested itself in such publications as
Military Policy and National Security, by
William W. Kauffman in 1956; Strategy in the
Missile Age, by Bernard Brodie in 1959; The
Necessity for Choice, by Henry Kissinger in
1960; and Strategy and Arms Control, by
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin
in 1961. This is by no means a complete
listing of the important works of the time but
an illustrative identification of the type of
work being done.
Over the years, beginning primarily with
World Wa r I I, military professionals found
themselves more and more involved in the
formulation as well as the implementation of
military and foreign policies. By the early
1960s, during the Kennedy Administration,
academic and military professionals found
themselves in an even more active partnership.
T h e intellectual in the Pentagon was
exemplified in the "systems analyst," and his
counterpart in the White House and the
Department of State was the "political
scientist."

T h e d e c a d e o f the 1960s, which
commenced with more promise of success
than any in recent years, turned out to be one
of the most disastrous in our history. What
went wrong? How could this happen with
some of the best minds of the academic
profession, and the best educated and most
sophisticated of the military profession in our
history making and implementing policy?
Primarily, Vietnam went wrong. Much has
been written about Vietnam and much m o r e
is to come. This article will not provide still
another review of that unhappy situation. The
effect of Vietnam on the academic and
military professions is, however, relevant here.
By a combination of what is increasingly
being perceived as some ill-conceived policies
on the part of the academics, turned
policymakers, and some poorly-implemented
actions on the part of the soldiers, it turned
sour. What should have been, by any
standard, a brilliant example of "the ordered
application of force in the resolution of a
social problem," turned out to be something
quite different. This was n o t a campus
experiment which could be called off or
redirected at will. It was a deep national
involvement which defied rational
explanation or solution. The effect it has
already had on American society is well
known. What had come to be a reasonably
s m o o t h working academic-military
partnership, albeit a somewhat strained one,
began to come apart at the proverbial seams
as the nation moved even deeper into the
morass of Vietnam.
Meanwhile, "back on the campus" many
academic professionals entered into an
impassioned debate over whether the United
States should ever have become involved in
Vietnam. Military professionals took note of
this debate briefly and many suggested that it
was interesting but, at the moment, quite
irrelevant because the nation in general, and
the soldier in particular, were in fact deeply
involved and the real question should have
been--What do we d o now?
For the answer to that question many
soldiers looked to the academic, turned
policymaker, in Washington. Although the
view may have been distorted by emotionally

clouded vision, what was perceived was
something of a continuing exodus from that
city by the academic hurrying back to his
campus to write a book to explain away his
responsibility for the involvement. To most
soldiers this was inexcusable. Some were
inclined to feel that the "Cambridge
Professors" had involved the nation in a war
and then placed unprecedented restraints on
its conduct. Then, as many professional
soldiers came to see it, when the going
became difficult and the war became
unpopular, the scholars "deserted" the
administration and the military professional
was left with a nasty mess to clean up.
There is a growing perception on the part
of many military professionals that they are
the victims of poor civilian policies. This is a
most unfortunate perception in that a t best it
can provide a convenient scapegoat for some
military professional shortcomings and will
tend to encourage further alienation of the
profession from American society. As a result,
the soldier's opinion of the academic, which
had become considerably more favorable over
the years, has suffered a significant setback.
Certainly, this adverse perception of his
a c a d e m i c colleagues by the military
professional is not universal. But a strong case
can be made that it is the dominant view.
The Vietnam adventure also seriously
strained any respect the academic professional
may have had for his military associate. Many
k n o w ledgeable scholars pose legitimate
questions concerning overall governmental
policy in Vietnam, but they also question the
conduct of the war by the soldier. They
question the strategy of attrition and ask why
it was not until mid-1968 that anything
resembling a comprehensive pacification
program evolved. They are on firm ground in
asking why, if "Vietnamization" is a truly
positive approach to finishing the task, it was
not seriously undertaken until 1969. They
question the misleading reports from the field
and speak of the credibility gap. They will
always wonder how the Tet offensive of 1968
could have been launched.
Shortly before he became a full time
policymaker, Henry Kissinger criticized the
military strategy as being essentially irrelevant

to the problem at hand. He argued that: "By
opting for military victory through attrition,
the American strategy produced what came to
be t h e characteristic feature of the
Vietnamese war: military success that could
not be translated into permanent political
advantage." 7
The academic profession in general has
considerably less respect for the American
military profession now than it had before
1965. As with the soldier's perception of the
intellectual outlined above, this view is not
fully shared by all members of the academic
profession but it is certainly widely held.
As a result of the war in Vietnam the
prestige of both the American academic and
military professions has fallen in the eyes of
the other and in the eyes of the nation as a
whole. The military profession has lost
prestige by association with the policies which
have become so unpopular in the United
States and as a result of its conduct of an
unpopular war. The academic profession has
lost prestige, not so much because of
association with the policies a very few of its
members developed, but as a result of the
campus unrest of recent years. Regardless of
how it came about, a nation which has lost
faith in its own academic and military
professions has been ill served by both.
WHERE WE STAND

Nevertheless, there is still a broad area of
mutual interdependence and cooperation
b e t w e e n t h e a c a d e m i c and military
professions. On a day-to-day basis, the
military profession relies on the academic
profession much more than the other way
around. On a highly abstract level, the service
the academic community receives from the
military profession is national security and
the maintenance of an environment in which
academic affairs can be pursued freely.
Some academics find it hard to agree that it
is the strength of the United States
Government, as manifested in part by its
military posture, which maintains the
essential environment of intellectual freedom
which permits criticism of the government.
There is no doubt that most professional

soldiers, perhaps in their "simplistic" way, see
this as their contribution and that they at
times become impatient when they are vilified
and condemned by those they think they are
serving.
The military profession calls upon the
academic community to provide many of its
young officers. Even though the Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) has been the
s u b j e c t of much anti-military activity
throughout the country it continues to serve
as a very important source of officers for the
military profession. In the view of many
military men, the true value of ROTC is
qualitative rather than quantitative. It brings
into the armed forces a diversity of
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c backgrounds and
philosophical orientations which produces a
leavening effect in the officer corps.
The anti-ROTC activity on the nation's
campuses has driven deeper the wedge of
mistrust between the academic and military
professions. Many professional soldiers tend
to see the academic community as responsible
for the closing of some ROTC units in
response t o pressure from campus radicals.
There is some truth in this. Many members of
the academic profession seem to agree that
academe has a responsibility to assist the
military profession in the education of
potential officers. They feel, however, that
the military profession had failed to maintain
an acceptable academic standard in ROTC
programs and that it had been reluctant t o
take corrective action. When pressures were
brought to bear to discontinue ROTC, its
academic defenders (and there were many)
had little basis for argument. They would
argue that it was military intransigence, not
academic anti-ROTC sympathy, which is to
blame. There is some truth in this also.
The unfortunate fact seems to be that
mutual distrust and lack of meaningful
dialogue brought about the termination of a
number of ROTC units at many of the
nation's most prestigious universities. Many
campuses, without a doubt, overreacted to
radical pressures and many military
professionals clearly overreacted to legitimate
requests from the campuses to upgrade the
programs.

The remaining area to be discussed is the
dependence of the military profession on the
academic community for scholarly analysis of
the profession and for critical development of
strategic concepts. It was suggested earlier
that academic interest in the military
profession on the socioeconomic level
developed toward the end of the 1950s. At
about the same time an academic interest in
the field of st r a t e g y developed, the
politico-military level also developed. Interest
in both areas served to stimulate national
concern for military affairs and, among other
things, caused the military professsion to do
some serious soul-searching. This academic
interest in military matters also caused the
military profession to take academe ever more
seriously.
In more recent years academic interest in
military affairs seems to have waned. The
reasons for this are not clear, but three broad
suggestions follow. One reason may be that
serious scholars feel the subject has been
intellectually exhausted. A second reason
might be the strong negative reaction to the
Vietnam War on the campuses and elsewhere
in the nation. National security is not a
popular subject at best and any emphasis on
military matters now would run counter to
contemporary trends. The third suggested
reason is that many academics had a hand in
military affairs to an unprecedented degree, to
i n c l u d e many of t h e details of
implementation of policy in Vietnam. Some
of those who became "doers" in Washington
may feel that they have had their fingers
burned and therefore tend to shy away from
it all. Some indefinable balance between the
first and second reasons is most likely the best
answer.
In reviewing Michael Howard's "Studies in
War and Peace" in The New Republic, Reed
Whitmore commented on this phenomenon in
part. He said:
In the late forties it was morally and
intellectually respectable among my
friends--graduate students, writers and
young teachers-- . . . to talk strategy and
tactics, to recognize the role of w a r and
the military life in human affairs. . . .

He then continued:
The climate of opinion has now changed
so drastically among young intellectuals
that I am reminded of the wipe-outs that
occured regularly in the society of
Orwell's 1984. . . .
For most young intellectuals now the
mode of thought displayed by Michael
Howard [that there is wisdom to be
gained by scholarly study of things
military]. . . is sure to be out of
bounds, . . . . The wipe-out process is
profoundly anti-intellectual and illiberal,
just as in Orwell; it has no place in the life
of a free mind.8
Within the academic profession some are
delighted to see the profession show less
interest in the "nefarious military." Within
the military profession there are some who
are equally delighted t o see this trend away
from what they perceive as blind interference
in military matters. There are many in both
professions who are, however, deeply
concerned lest academic disinterest in military
affairs have a negative influence on the nation
as a whole. If the campuses take no interest in
military affairs the military profession will
look more to its associated "think tanks" or
its own officers for conceptual thinking. The
end result will be that the academic
profession will have less influence on military
policy.
The generations which will produce the flag
and general officers of tomorrow have
pursued more formal education at civilian
institutions than their predecessors, and have
been more influenced by the American
academic community than any before. Where
are the succeeding generations of scholars
interested in national security affairs t o be
found? Where are the successors to Millis,
Huntington, Janowitz, Schelling, Brodie,
Kauffman and Kissinger? Are the young
scholars to be frightened away from this vital
study of military affairs because it is no
longer popular in academe and is no longer
the sure way to achieve academic rank and
recognition? If this is true, the academic
profession has negated its right to be taken

seriously by the military profession and the
nation in its criticism of national security
affairs in general, and military affairs in
particular.
T h e following broad hypothesis is
suggested as t h e contemporary
academic-military alignment. Within the
academic profession the older members have
m o r e understanding of the military
profession, including its strengths and
weaknesses and its relationship with academe,
than do the younger scholars. This can be
a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e academic-military
partnership established in and continuing
from World War II into the early 1960s and to
the negative reaction to Vietnam.
In the military profession, the most senior
officers tend to have less understanding of
a c a d e m e , including its strengths and
weaknesses, than do the more junior officers.
This can be attributed in part to reluctant
acceptance by many military officers of the
academic partnership years ago and by their
reaction to some harsh treatment, as they
perceived it, by the "whiz kids" and other
young intellectuals in government in the early
1960s. The much greater exposure of many
younger officers to the academic community
makes them less critical and more receptive.
What may be developing then is a situation
in which the academic profession rejects
military affairs at the very time that the
military profession is intellectually best
prepared to work closely with academe. If the
academic community does not respond to the
need for a scholarly interest in military
affairs, the military profession will likely
develop its own corps of in-house scholars to
substitute for, rather than work with, the
academic community. This is a somewhat
frightening prospect and it should be carefully
examined by the academic and the military
professions.
It will be interesting to see how the mutual
misperceptions discussed above may be
affected by the recent revelations in the
"Pentagon Papers." One could posit that
there is adequate material in the "papers" to
support almost any preconceived prejudice
and that in the final analysis there will be
little effect. Time will tell.

CONCLUSIONS

The introductory paragraphs emphasized
the concern of this article with the American
academic a n d military professions'
perceptions of one another. Some of the
perceptions discussed above are closer to the
truth than others, but inter-professional
relationships are built on perception, not
necessarily truth. In today's complex
domestic and international environment the
nation cannot, for whatever reason, afford to
have its academic and military professions on
nonspeaking terms. There are "radical"
elements in both professions who could not
possibly find anything in common. They must
be recognized by both as atypical.
Members of both professions must
understand enough about the other to
c o u n t e r o f t e n emotionally generated
negativism. A reasonable place to begin, and it
is a shallow beginning at best, is to understand
the basic similarities and differences. Both can
then at least understand why the other thinks
as he does. For example, I doubt seriously if
the military profession as a whole understands
the intellectual's perception of his role as a
critic of society, and I doubt equally seriously
if t h e intellectual community really
understands why it is difficult for the soldier
to criticize in a similar way. It is important
for the academic to understand why the
soldier may feel he was deserted in Vietnam
by the academic community.
Understanding the differences does not and
should not suggest agreement, but it should
provide a basis for discussion. Both
professions should have at least a fundamental
understanding of the rules in each which lead
to rank and recognition. Both must accept the
fact that his own profession has many of the
same human weaknesses as the other. The
human motivation, for example, which drives
an aspiring scholar to "publish" is not much
different than that which drives the military
officer to seek "command." The trend toward
less mutual respect between the professions is
dangerous. Time will heal some of the wounds
but world events move quickly and unlimited
time is not necessarily available.
The military tendency to rely more heavily
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o n the academic profession for the education
of its officers is encouraging and a credit to
the military profession. The willingness of
academe to participate in these programs is
equally encouraging and a credit to the
academic profession. It is important that the
academic community accept its responsibility
fully. The apparent trend of the academic
profession to move away from the scholarly
study of military matters by both the military
sociologist and the strategic analyst is
disturbing and should be looked at closely.
The United States will be ill-served by a
military profession turned "academic" and by
an academic profession turned "soldier." On
this there should be little disagreement. The
nation does, however, need a military
profession with the intellectual competence
t o understand and work with the academic
profession, just as it needs an academic
profession which maintains a scholarly
interest in military affairs so as to provide
rational, positive criticism. The separation
between the "doer" and the "thinker" is valid
and must remain, but the two must converse
on a mutually understandable level.
In the final analysis, neither profession
should rest content to permit the other to
hold a monopoly in so vital an area as the

conceptual thinking pertaining to the security
of our nation.
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